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Executive Summary 
Bolivia’s economic growth in the last four years has been higher than at any time in the last 30 years, 
averaging 5.2 percent annually since the current administration took office in 2006. Projected GDP 
growth for 2009 is the highest in the hemisphere. It is worth noting that Bolivia’s growth for 2009 
follows its peak growth rate in 2008. As discussed in more detail below, Bolivia’s 2009 growth is all 
the more remarkable in view of the size and number of negative shocks to the economy. These 
included falling remittances, declining foreign investment, the United States’ revocation of trade 
preferences, declining export prices and markets for part of the year and other impacts of the global 
recession.  
During the last four years, the Morales government also faced serious bouts of political instability as 
a result of separatist political opposition movements and leaders that did not recognize the 
legitimacy of the elected government. This political situation had negative impacts on private 
investment as well as resulting in some capital flight. 
The government used fiscal policy effectively to counter-act the impact of the world recession. The 
fiscal position of the government went from a surplus of 5.0 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 
2008 to a deficit of 0.7 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 2009, a huge shift of nearly 6 
percentage points of GDP. This is probably the most important policy move that helped Bolivia 
avoid the worst effects of the downturn, relative to the most of the rest of the region. It included an 
increase in public investment 6.3 percent of GDP in 2005 to 10.5 percent in 2009. 
 It is worth noting that this would not have been possible without the control that the government 
gained over its natural gas production and revenues. 
Since 2004, government revenue has risen by almost 20 percentage points of GDP, as shown in 
Figure 5. (This is an enormous increase; for comparison, total revenue to the federal government in 
the United States has averaged 18.7 percent of GDP over the past 40 years). Most of this increase 
came as a result of an increase in the government’s revenue from hydrocarbons, due to increased 
royalty payments, the Morales’ government’s re-nationalization of the industry, and price increases. 
Capital formation has also increased significantly, from 13.0 percent in 2005 to 17.2 percent in 2008. 
In the last three years the government has begun several programs targeted at the poorest Bolivians. 
These include payments to poor families to increase school enrollment; an expansion of public 
pensions to relive extreme poverty among the elderly; and most recently, payments for uninsured 
mothers to expand prenatal and post-natal care, to reduce infant and child mortality. 
Data on poverty and extreme poverty rates do not go past 2007, and do not show improvement for 
the first two years of the Morales administration. Data on inequality also go only to 2007; but there 
appears to be a reduction in inequality in these two years, with the Gini coefficient falling from 60.2 
to 56.3. 
Although the last two years of new programs will probably show some improvement when data is 
available, Bolivia has some of the highest extreme poverty rates and infant and child mortality rates 
in the hemisphere. The government’s social spending has increased only slightly in the last four 
years; this indicates that there is much more that needs to be done. With a greatly expanded resource  Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 4 
base as a result of the government’s increased control over the country’s national resources, it 
should be possible to do better in these areas in the years ahead. With regard to future growth and 
development, the country is not financially constrained, and its success going forward would appear 
to depend more on its ability to successfully plan and implement development projects and increase 
capital formation, involving both public and private investment. Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 5 
Introduction 
Over the last four years, since Bolivia’s President Evo Morales took office, the Bolivian economy 
has growth rapidly. The government has increased its control over natural resources and vastly 
increased its revenues, and effectively used expansionary fiscal policy to counter-act some of the 
negative impacts from the world economic downturn. This paper looks at the overall and sectoral 
growth of the economy, fiscal and monetary policy, public debt and international reserve 
accumulation, and other available economic and social indicators during these four years.  
Economic Growth 
Bolivia’s economic growth in the last four years has been higher than at any time in the last 30 years, 
averaging 5.2 percent annually since the current administration took office in 2006. This can be seen 
in Figure 1, with GDP growth peaking at 6.1 percent in 2008. With the onset of the world recession, 
GDP growth fell back to a projected 3-4 percent for 2009.
1  
FIGURE 1 
Bolivia: Real Change in Year-Over-Year GDP 
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1  As shown in Figure 1, the IMF projects 2.8 percent growth for 2009 while the Bolivian Ministry of Finance projects 
4.0 percent growth for 2009.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 6 
Even using the IMF’s most recent projections for 2009 growth (2.8 percent), Bolivia comes in at the 
top for projected GDP growth in the hemisphere. Most of the hemisphere – 23 of the 34 countries 
listed – are expected to see their economies shrink this year. This can be seen in Table 1. It is worth 
noting that Bolivia’s growth for 2009 follows its peak growth rate in 2008. As discussed in more 
detail below, Bolivia’s 2009 growth is all the more remarkable in view of the size and number of 
negative shocks to the economy. These included falling remittances, declining foreign investment, 
the United States’ revocation of trade preferences, declining export prices and markets for part of 
the year and other impacts of the global recession.  
During the whole period of nearly four years, the government also faced serious bouts of political 
instability as a result of separatist political opposition movements and leaders that did not recognize 
the legitimacy of the elected government, the first headed by an indigenous president. Some of these 
groups and individuals used violence, economic sabotage, and other extra-parliamentary methods to 
create instability. Furthermore, as is common in situations of political transition where previously 
excluded citizens – in this case the indigenous and poor majority – achieve representation, there 
were negative impacts on private investment as well as some capital flight.  
Perhaps the most important factor that contributed to the growth of the last two years, in spite of 
the negative shocks to the economy, was a large-scale and well-timed increase in public spending, 
which will be described below.  
Table 2 shows a breakdown by sector of the country’s economic growth in recent years. The sectoral 
composition of the economy has not changed all that much in recent years. One of the biggest 
expansions has been in minerals, which went from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2005 to 6.1 percent of 
GDP in 2009. The hydrocarbon sector, despite its massive contribution to government revenues 
(see below), actually fell from 6.4 to 4.9 percent of GDP during this period. Manufacturing held its 
own, at 11.2 percent of GDP for 2008 and 11.9 percent for the first half of this year, as compared to 
11.6 percent in 2005. This is different from the decline in many countries’ manufacturing sectors 
during the world recession, mainly because Bolivian manufacturing was not as vulnerable as most to 
the fall-off in export markets. The agricultural sector (which includes forestry, game, and fishing) 
declined a bit from 11.8 percent of GDP to 10.4 percent of GDP in 2008, but it has risen to 12.3 
percent for the first half of the year. Agriculture and manufacturing are the two largest sectors of the 
economy, together accounting for about a quarter of GDP. Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 7 
TABLE 1 
Western Hemisphere: IMF Projections of Real GDP Growth 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1. Bolivia (Finance Ministry projection)  4.4%  4.8%  4.6%  6.1%  4.0% 
(IMF projection)  4.4  4.8  4.6  6.1  2.8 
2.  Guyana  -1.9 5.1 5.4  3.0 2.0 
3. Haiti  1.8  2.3  3.4  1.2  2.0 
4. Panama  7.2  8.5  11.5  9.2  1.8 
5. Peru  6.8  7.7  8.9  9.8  1.5 
6.  Suriname  3.9 4.5 5.4  6.0 1.5 
7. Dominica  3.3  3.8  1.8  3.2  1.1 
8.  Belize  3.0 4.7 1.2  3.8 1.0 
9. Uruguay  6.8  4.6  7.6  8.9  0.6 
10. Dominican Republic  9.3  10.7  8.5  5.3  0.5 
11. Guatemala  3.3  5.4  6.3  4.0  0.4 
12. Antigua and Barbuda  5.5  12.4  6.9  2.8  -6.5 
13. Colombia  5.7  6.9  7.5  2.5  -0.3 
14.  Brazil  3.2 4.0 5.7  5.1 -0.7 
15. Trinidad and Tobago  6.2  13.5  4.6  2.3  -0.8 
16.  Ecuador  6.0 3.9 2.5  6.5 -1.0 
17. Nicaragua  4.4  3.9  3.2  3.2  -1.0 
18. St. Vincent and the Grenadines  2.6  7.6  7.0  0.9  -1.1 
19. Costa Rica  5.9  8.8  7.8  2.6  -1.5 
20.  Chile  5.6 4.6 4.7  3.2 -1.7 
21. Honduras  6.1  6.7  6.3  4.0  -2.0 
22. St. Kitts and Nevis  5.6  5.3  0.9  2.4  -2.0 
23. Venezuela  10.3  10.3  8.4  4.8  -2.0 
24.  Argentina  9.2 8.5 8.7  6.8 -2.5 
25. Canada  3.0  2.9  2.5  0.4  -2.5 
26. El Salvador  3.1  4.2  4.7  2.5  -2.5 
27. St. Lucia  4.4  5.0  1.7  0.7  -2.5 
Average (Weighted by GDP)  3.3  3.2  2.8  1.2  -2.6 
28. United States  3.1  2.7  2.1  0.4  -2.7 
29.  Barbados  3.9 3.2 3.4  0.2 -3.0 
30. Jamaica  1.0  2.7  1.5  -1.0  -3.6 
31.  Bahamas  5.7 4.3 0.7 -1.7 -3.9 
32. Grenada  11.0  -2.3  4.9  2.2  -4.0 
33.  Paraguay  2.9 4.3 6.8  5.8 -4.5 
34. Mexico  3.2  5.1  3.3  1.3  -7.3 
Source: IMF 2009b, García 2009, Authors’ Calculations. 
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TABLE 2 
Bolivia: Share of GDP and Real Growth, by Sector and Type of Expenditure 
 2003  2004  2005(p)  2006(p)  2007(p)  2008(p)  2009  (Jan-June)
 Share
1  Growth Share Growth Share Growth Share Growth Share Growth Share Growth Share Growth
By Sector:                      
Agriculture, Forestry, Game  
and Fishing  13.4% 8.7% 13.3% 0.2%  11.8% 5.0% 10.9%  4.3%  10.0% -0.5% 10.4% 2.6% 12.3% 3.2%
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas  4.3 8.9 6.0  24.2  6.4  14.6  6.4  4.6  6.5 5.2 5.7 2.0 4.9  -13.1 
Minerals (Metal and non-metal)  3.2  0.6  3.4  -8.4  3.5  10.6  5.2  6.7  5.8  10.0  8.6  56.3  6.1  14.4 
Manufacturing  12.8 3.8  12.5  5.6 11.6  3.0 11.3  8.1  11.4 6.1  11.2 3.7  11.9 2.8 
Electricity, Gas, and Water  3.0  2.9  2.8  3.1  2.6  2.7  2.3  4.0  2.2  4.3  2.0  3.6  2.1  4.6 
Construction  2.3  -23.7 2.1  2.2  2.2  6.4  2.4  8.2  2.4  14.3 2.3 9.2 1.7 7.8 
Commerce  6.8  2.5  7.0  3.9  6.6  3.1  6.4  3.8  6.8  5.6  7.0  4.8  6.3  3.7 
Transportation and 
Communications  12.3 3.9  11.9  4.0 11.3  2.9 10.2  3.9  9.4 3.5 8.4 4.0 8.8 5.1 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, 
and Business Services  10.9  -3.3  9.8  -1.5  9.3  0.4  8.6  5.4  8.6  6.3  8.3  4.7  9.0  3.4 
Public Administration Services  12.6 3.4  12.4  3.4 12.0  3.6 11.0  3.7  11.0 4.1  10.4 3.8  10.9 5.5 
Other Services  8.5  1.1  8.2  2.7  7.6  1.3  7.0  2.4  6.7  2.8  6.3  2.3  6.9  2.6 
Imputed Bank Services  -3.2 -9.7 -2.8  -6.6  -2.9 6.2  -2.9  16.3  -3.1 11.3 -3.1  8.6 -3.4  3.6 
Taxes and Duties  12.9  2.9  13.3  10.0  18.0  8.6  21.2  6.0  22.3  6.3  22.5  6.9  22.7  2.5 
By Expenditure Type:                        
Consumption  87.5% 2.1% 84.2% 2.9%  82.3% 3.3% 77.1%  4.0% 77.3% 4.1% 75.5% 5.3%    
     Government  16.5  3.6  16.3  3.1  16.0  3.4  14.4  3.3  14.1  3.8  13.3  3.9    
     Households and Nonprofits  71.0  1.9  67.9  2.9  66.3  3.3  62.8  4.1  63.2  4.2  62.2  5.5     
                           
Gross Fixed Capital Formation  12.7  -10.8  11.7  -1.1  13.0  6.7  14.3  9.3  16.1  12.6  17.2  18.7     
                           
Net Exports  -0.8  -123.5  4.8  593.7  3.5  -42.4  9.0  108.1  7.5  -7.1  6.9  -62.4     
     Exports of Goods and Services  25.6  12.2 31.1  16.6 35.5 8.3 41.8  11.3  41.8  3.1 44.9 2.2    
     Imports of Goods and Services  26.4  0.9  26.3  5.5  32.1  14.8  32.8  5.2  34.3  4.4  38.0  9.4     
Note:  
1 Sector’s share of GDP. (p): Preliminary      
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2009b.Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 9 
When looking at this sectoral breakdown, however, it is important to keep in mind that the Bolivian 
economy is still divided between a relatively low-productivity part of the economy, which provides 
about 83 percent of employment but only about 25 percent of GDP, and the higher-productivity 
economic activity, which contributes about 65 percent of GDP but only 9 percent of employment.
2 
This is one of the long-term development challenges that the country is facing. 
On the positive side, gross capital formation increased from 13.0 percent in 2005 to 17.2 percent of 
GDP in 2008, a substantial increase, with annual increases of 18.7 percent in 2008 and 12.6 percent 
in 2007. This is very important because Bolivia’s overall rate of investment was low, especially for a 
developing country, and remains relatively low. In order for Bolivia to increase living standards over 
the intermediate to long run, it will have to increase the share of capital formation in GDP.  
These figures do not show how much of the capital formation was private, and how much was in 
the public sector; but presumably much of it was in the public sector.  
Net exports contributed unevenly to the growth since 2005, first more than doubling as a percent of 
GDP from 3.5 to 9.0 percent, then falling back in 2007 and 2008, with net exports representing 6.9 
percent of GDP in 2008. 
 
                                                 
2  World Bank 2005.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 10 
Inflation and Monetary Policy 
Figure 2 shows inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index,
3 and also core inflation, 
excluding food and energy. Inflation accelerated from 4.9 percent at the end of 2006 to 14.1 percent 
in March 2008. However, as can be seen in the figure, this is almost all a result of food and energy 
price increases. If we remove food and energy from the index, as shown in the lower line of the 
graph, inflation did not increase very much, and was just 4.6 percent in March 2008. Core inflation 
did rise after March 2008 to a peak of 9.2 percent in December, but it too fell back to 2.4 percent by 
November. 
FIGURE 2 
Bolivia: Monthly Inflation Rate (%), year-over-year   
14.1%
0.8%
17.3%
4.6%
2.4%
9.3%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
y
e
a
r
-
o
v
e
r
-
y
e
a
r
)
Overall Inflation
Core Inflation               
(excluding food and energy)
Note: The Bolivian government changed the weights used in calculating inflation in 2008. Here, we use the new 
weights on all data, new and old. Thus, older data may not be identical to official inflation data.    
Source: Weisbrot and Rosnick 2009, Banco Central de Bolivia 2009i. 
 
At the time that overall inflation hit 14 percent, in March of 2008, the government came under 
considerable pressure to adopt contractionary macroeconomic policies, to slow economic growth in 
order reduce inflation. Opposition and media groups – the largest media outlets in Bolivia rely 
overwhelmingly on opposition sources and political messaging – conjured up memories of Bolivia’s 
1984-1986 hyperinflation. The International Monetary Fund advocated for allowing the exchange 
rate to appreciate more, which would also have slowed the economy by reducing exports, in order to 
reduce inflation. With some exceptions – noted below -- the government resisted the pressure to 
                                                 
3 It is measured year-over-year in this figure – i.e., each data point measures the price level in a given month as compared 
to the same month one year earlier. Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 11 
adopt policies that would reduce real growth and employment in order to bring down inflation. And, 
as was predicted, the inflation proved to be temporary and externally driven.  
This understanding of the temporary and externally-driven nature of the inflation of 2007-2008 
proved to be very important in allowing the government to adopt the correct macroeconomic 
policies, in spite of considerable political pressure, aided by the media, to slow the economy just as 
the hemisphere and the world were headed for a major recession. The government’s policies in this 
period helped Bolivia keep growing while other economies in the region contracted. 
Another successful aspect of monetary policy during this period was the reduction of dollarization 
of the economy. Figure 3 shows the percentage of Bolivia’s money supply that is dollar-
denominated. As can be seen, it fell from 71 percent at the beginning of 2006 to 44 percent in 
September 2009. This reflects depositors’ and investors’ increasing confidence in the domestic 
currency and economy. It is an important trend in that it helps enable the government to conduct 
effective monetary policy.
4 
FIGURE 3 
Bolivia: Dollarization (Measured as the difference between M’3 and M3, as a percentage of M’3)
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Source: Banco Central de Bolivia 2009g. 
                                                 
4  This is a reform that the IMF had advocated – see IMF 2009b for more detail.  
5  M3 and M’3 are measures of the broad money supply. M3 includes cash, traveler’s checks, most types of bank 
deposits, bank reserves, and other liquid assets. M’3 includes all of these assets as well as foreign currency. Thus, the 
difference between M’3 and M3, as a percentage of M’3, is the proportion of the money supply that is denominated in 
foreign currency.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 12 
Fiscal Policy 
 
Since 2004, government revenue has risen by almost 20 percentage points of GDP, as shown in 
Figure 4. This is an enormous increase; for comparison, total revenue to the federal government in 
the United States has averaged 18.7 percent of GDP over the past 40 years.
6 Most of this increase 
came as a result of an increase in the government’s revenue from hydrocarbons, which began with 
an increase in royalty payments enacted in 2005. The Morales administration continued to increase 
collections from hydrocarbon companies, re-nationalizing the industry in 2006. Thus, from 2004-
2008 the government’s revenue from hydrocarbons increased by $3.5 billion, or from $58.3 dollars 
per capita to $401.1 (in constant 2008 dollars). These hydrocarbon revenue increases can be seen in 
Figure 5, which shows an increase from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2004 to a peak of 25.7 percent in the 
fourth quarter of 2008. Most of this increase occurred after 2006. Hydrocarbon revenue has since 
fallen back from its peak, to 21.1 percent in the second quarter of 2009. This is mainly from the 
world fall-off in hydrocarbon prices that occurred in the third quarter of 2008 which hit Bolivia with 
a lag time because of the government’s contracts with foreign gas companies. 
FIGURE 4 
Bolivia: Government Overall Fiscal Balance as a Percentage of GDP 
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Revenue 33.7  30.5  27.7 28.9 27.5 31.7 39.1 43.6 48.4   45.6 49.2 48.1 50.6 46.7 44.3 
Spending  37.4  37.3  36.5 36.8 33.0 34.0 34.6 41.9 45.1   35.5 41.2 41.4 63.6 40.3 41.0 
Balance -3.7 -6.8 -8.8  -7.9  -5.5  -2.3 4.5 1.7 3.2   5.0 6.2 3.9 1.7  -0.7 1.7 
Note: Quarterly data use quarterly GDP.    
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia 2009d. 
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Spending also increased considerably during the Morales years, but much less than revenue – from 
34 in 2005 to 45.1 percent of GDP in 2008. This allowed for sizeable fiscal surpluses during these 
years, a contrast to the consistent budget deficits from 2000-2005, as shown in Figure 4. As will be 
noted below, it also led to a huge increase in international reserves, probably more than necessary. 
However, the most important fiscal policy was the increases in spending in 2007 and 2008-2009 
(first half). The fiscal position of the government went from a surplus of 5.0 percent of GDP in the 
first quarter of 2008 to a deficit of 0.7 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 2009, a huge shift of 
nearly 6 percentage points of GDP. This is probably the most important policy move that helped 
Bolivia avoid the worst effects of the downturn, relative to the most of the rest of the region. It is 
worth noting that this would not have been possible without the control that the government gained 
over its natural gas production and revenues. 
FIGURE 5 
Bolivia: Government Hydrocarbon Revenue, 2000-2009 
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Public Investment and Social Spending 
Figure 6 shows a breakdown of budgeted government spending for public investment since 2003. It 
shows that public investment increased from 6.3 percent of GDP in 2005 to 10.5 percent in 2009. 
About 1.5 percentage points of this increase was for infrastructure. Thus, public investment, 
including infrastructure, was an important part of the increase in public spending, especially in the 
stimulus spending of 2009. Investment in infrastructure is likely to play an important role in any 
development strategy in Bolivia; according to the World Bank, transportation costs in Bolivia are 
about 20 times as high as in Brazil.
7  
FIGURE 6 
Bolivia: Public Investment, Budgeted  
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Part of the increase in public investment reflects the creation of the Productive Development Bank 
(BDP - Banco de Desarrollo Productivo) in 2007. The BDP’s institutional predecessor, La  Nacional 
Financiera de Bolivia, had a portfolio of approximately US$26.6 million at the end of 2006.
8 After its 
reinvention, the BDP’s portfolio has grown steadily; as of October 2009, the BDP has lent US$156 
million to 15,903 creditors (for an average of approximately US$10,000 each), as show in Figure 7. 
This figure represents about 1 percent of Bolivia’s 2008 GDP. 
                                                 
7 World Bank 2005. 
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FIGURE 7 
Bolivia: Portfolio of the Banco de Desarrollo Productivo, 2007 – 2009 
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Bolivia has also increased spending on social programs aimed at health and education for the poor. 
Three major cash transfers have been developed with hydrocarbon revenue: Bono Juancito Pinto, 
Renta Dignidad, and Bono Juana Azurduy. The latter began only a few months ago; coverage data 
for the other two programs are shown in Table 3, below. 
•  Bono Juancito Pinto began in 2006. It gives grants of 200 bolivianos (approximately US$29) 
yearly to children as an incentive to continue their education through the sixth grade of 
primary school; students must be enrolled in school to receive it.  
•  Renta Dignidad began in 2008, an expansion of the previous Bonosol program. It gives 
grants to all low-income residents over age 60 to prevent extreme poverty among the elderly: 
1800 bolivianos (approximately US$258) to those who receive Social Security payments, and 
2400 (approximately $344) to those who do not.  
•  Bono Juana Azurduy (also known as the Bono Madre Niño Niña) began in May 2009. It 
gives funds to uninsured new mothers as an incentive for them to seek medical care during 
and after their pregnancies, in order to reduce maternal and infant mortality. New mothers 
receive 50 bolivianos each for four pre-natal medical visits, 120 bolivianos for the childbirth, 
and 125 bolivianos for each medical appointment until the child’s second birthday. Mothers 
must show that they have the required medical visits in order to receive the funds. 
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TABLE 3 
Bolivia: Coverage Rates for the Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad, 2006-2008 
  Number of Beneficiaries  Percent of Relevant Population Covered 
  Bono Juancito Pinto  Renta Dignidad/Bonosol  Bono Juancito Pinto  Renta Dignidad/Bonosol
2006  1,085,360 487,832  61.8%  76.9% 
2007  1,323,999 493,437  75.1%  75.4% 
2008  1,681,135 687,962  95.9%  101.8% 
Sources: Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Pensiones 2009, Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2009c 
and 2009d, Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas 2009, Authors’ calculations.  
Note: Relevant populations are students enrolled in primary school, for Bono Juancito Pinto, and residents over age 
60, for Renta Dignidad. Enrollment is available through 2007; for 2008, enrollment is estimated as the average of 
the prior five years.  Population estimates are INE’s projections based on the 2001 census, and may result in 
coverage rates over 100%. 
 
Poverty and Inequality 
The most recent data on poverty for Bolivia do not go past 2007. These are shown in Table 4. There 
is little movement in the poverty rate since 2005; it increases by 0.5 percentage points from 2005-
2007. Similarly, the extreme poverty rate increases by one percentage point. However this does not 
take into account any increase in access to government services such as health care or education, and 
does not include the impact of the expansion of the programs described above in 2008. Among 
access to household amenities, the biggest increase is in electricity, which increased by nearly 12 
percentage points, from 68.3 to 80.2 percent of households. Access to sewage systems also increased 
from 45.9 to 50.8 percent of households; access to running water increased only slightly. 
TABLE 4 
Bolivia: Poverty and Living Standards 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003- 
2004
1  2005 2006 2007 
Poverty:                 
     Poverty  -  -  63.5  66.4 63.1  63.3  -  59.6  59.9 60.1 
     Extreme Poverty  -  -  40.7  45.2 38.8  39.5  -  36.7  37.7 37.7 
Household  Amenities:            
     No more than 3 people  
per  bedroom  42.5 51.6 67.4 67.4 68.0 59.7 60.2 60.6 69.5 71.5 
     Electricity  67.3  71.3  70.9  70.0 69.3  64.0  66.5  68.3  76.2 80.2 
     Access to running water
2  82.6 85.4 81.5 84.5 84.7 82.3 83.3 85.1 84.3 86.0 
     Sewage systems
  38.3 43.1 42.6 42.2 41.4 40.7 40.4 45.9 41.9 50.8 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2009d. 
Notes: 
1. Data for 2003-2004 correspond to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares survey that took place between November 
2003 and November 2004. 
2. We classify as having running water those homes with piped or well water (based inside or outside the home, 
individually or community-based). We classify as not having access to running water households that access 
water via rivers, lakes, and trucks. We classify as having sewage systems households with septic tanks or 
sewage system connections. We classify as not having sewage systems households with outhouses or with no 
bathroom facilities. 
 Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 17 
Given the resources that the government has accumulated in the last few years, there is clearly room 
for more efforts in the area of poverty reduction. The programs described above are a significant 
start, but they need to be expanded. A rate of 37.7 percent for extreme poverty, even if it has come 
down some in the last two years, is still very high. Extreme poverty means not having regular access 
to basic needs for survival: for example, about 28 percent do not have drinkable water, and about 24 
percent of children under 3 years old are malnourished.
9 Programs for distributing subsidized food 
would seem to be an urgent priority, and some of this was implemented in 2008 when food prices 
soared. Still, much more needs to be done, especially in rural areas; 40 percent of the population is 
still employed in agriculture. Some of this is an intermediate and long-term development challenge, 
i.e. creating employment and increasing productivity in agriculture; but much can be done in the 
short run by increasing access to subsidized food, inputs for small producers, and infrastructure to 
increase access to drinkable water. Since the government has excess reserves, and inflation is far 
from being a threat, the main challenge is to mobilize and administer the resources for practical 
projects. 
FIGURE 8 
Bolivia: Infant and Child Mortality 
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Figure 8 shows the decline in infant and child mortality over the last 20 years. There has been no 
measured decline in neonatal mortality for the years 2005-2008, and relatively little decline in overall 
infant mortality. These rates are among the highest in the hemisphere. However, the Bono Juana 
                                                 
9 World Bank 2005.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 18 
Azurduy program describe above, which specifically targets prenatal care, began in May 2009. It 
remains to be seen how much impact it will have; clearly it is very much needed. 
Data on inequality go only through 2007. As shown in Figure 9, in the two years 2005-2007 there is 
decline in inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient, from 60.2 to 56.3.  
FIGURE 9 
Bolivia: Gini Coefficient 
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FIGURE 10 
Bolivia: Social Spending, 1999-2008 
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Source: Banco Central de Bolivia 2009i, Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2009b, Ministerio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas 2009.  
 
Figure 10 shows social spending in real (inflation-adjusted Bolivianos), and as a percentage of GDP. 
In real terms, social spending increased only modestly, about 6.3 percent over the three years 2005-
2008. As a percentage of GDP, it actually fell slightly, from 12.4 to 11.2 percent of GDP.
10  
Given the size and needs of Bolivia’s poor population, as discussed above, and the increased 
resources that the government has accumulated in the recent years, it would seem that social 
spending for poverty alleviation and basic needs such as food, health care, and education should be 
increased. 
 
                                                 
10 It is possible that this does not measure all of the increase in social spending that has taken place in the last few years, 
if some of this spending is off budget – for example, there are health services that have been provided by foreign 
governments such as Venezuela and Cuba, these may not be included in budgeted spending.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 20 
International Reserves and Public Debt 
International reserves have soared since 2005, increasing from $1.8 billion at the beginning of 2006 
to $8.5 billion as of September 2009. As a percentage of its economy, Bolivia has more reserves than 
China. 
Of course it was beneficial that Bolivia went in to the world recession with a high level of reserves. 
For low and middle-income countries, the level of international reserves is the main constraint that 
can make it difficult to pursue counter-cyclial policies – as compared to countries with “hard” 
currencies such as the U.S. and Japan. The potential problem for most developing countries is that 
they can run into foreign exchange shortages as imports grow with the economy, while exports and 
foreign capital inflows fall. Many of the countries that have turned to the International Monetary 
Fund for loans during the current world downturn have had these problems. Bolivia’s accumulation 
of reserves in recent years has given it a form of “self-insurance,” as has happened in many countries 
since the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s.
11 
Nonetheless, there are costs to keeping reserves. The real returns on reserve holdings, much of 
which are in U.S. treasury obligations, is very low and can even be negative; whereas these resources 
can have high returns if invested domestically.
12 Also, the government of Bolivia, fearing the 
potential inflationary impact of the reserve accumulation, has in recent years sterilized the impact of 
the reserves by issuing bonds in domestic currency. This added to the country’s public debt (see 
below), and the interest rate on these bonds has been high, sometimes exceeding 10 percent. 
Furthermore, most of these reserves are in dollar-denominated assets, and they lose value as the 
dollar declines. 
Figure 11 shows the rapid accumulation of reserves in Bolivia as a percentage of broad money. It 
soared from 43.6 percent at the beginning of 2006 to a peak of 90.6 percent in August 2008, 
dropping slightly to 84.5 percent today. For the years 2000-2003 it was only about 25 percent. It is 
possible that the level of reserves was too low in the past, and there are different ways to measure 
the adequacy of reserves, but it seems that the amount currently held by Bolivia’s central bank is 
much more than needed. We can also compare Bolivia to other countries with a similar exchange 
rate regime (a crawling peg). The average for these countries, according to the IMF, is 41 percent of 
broad money. Thus Bolivia has more than twice the level of reserves as countries similarly situated. 
Even if we compare to countries with fixed exchange rates, Bolivia is still at more than twice the 
level of these countries as well. We may take into account also that the Bolivian economy is more 
dollarized than other countries, which would imply a higher risk of a sudden increase in demand for 
foreign exchange. But even taking this into account, there is still a large amount of excess foreign 
reserves, probably more than $2 billion.
13 
 
                                                 
11 See Weisbrot 2007 and Weisbrot et al. 2009.  
12 For more information, see Baker and Walentin 2001 and Rodrik 2006. 
13 Reducing reserves by $2 billion would still leave the Central Bank with reserves equal to more than 60 percent of 
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FIGURE 11 
Bolivia: International Reserves, in USD and as a Percentage of the Money Supply 
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Source: Banco Central de Bolivia 2009e and 2009g.  
 
The accumulation of excess foreign reserves represents part of Bolivia’s development challenge, 
which is to convert the recently acquire trade surpluses, based mostly on hydrocarbons and other 
mineral exports, to investment that can increase the economy’s long run productivity as well as 
levels of employment. 
Public Debt 
Figure 12 shows the level of public debt for Bolivia in recent years. As can be seen, it has declined 
from 74.7 percent of GDP in 2005 to 45.4 percent through the first half of 2009. Almost all of this 
decline has been in external debt, which fell from 51.6 percent of GDP in 2005 to 14.1 percent in 
the first half of 2009. The biggest declines came from debt cancellation from the multilateral banks, 
through the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) Initiative from the IMF and World Bank, and 
also the MDRI (Multi-lateral Debt Relief Initiative). Bolivia’s successful completion of the HIPC 
requirements by 2001, which probably had a negative impact on its economy, and subsequent 
qualification for relief under MDRI, led to a cancellation of $1.52 billion, or 13.2 percent of GDP in 
World Bank debt in 2006; and $231 million, or 2.0 percent of GDP in IMF debt. This represented 
almost all of the country’s debt to the IMF, and over 90 percent of its debt to the World Bank. In 
2007, the Inter-American Development Bank cancelled $1 billion, or 7.5 percent of GDP of 
Bolivia’s debt. Thus Bolivia’s debt to multi-lateral banks fell by 36.7 percent of GDP from 2005-
2009, a very large debt reduction. 
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FIGURE 12 
Bolivia: Public Sector Debt 
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The country’s record-high real growth of the last four years also contributed to the reduction in debt 
as a percentage of GDP, and the uptick in inflation in 2007-2008 also contributed some. 
The large decline in multilateral and external debt was partly offset by an increase in domestic debt, 
which rose from 23.1 percent of GDP in 2005 to 31.2 percent through the first half of 2009. Most 
of this was the result of bonds issued in order to sterilize the accumulation of international reserves. 
This debt accumulation was probably unnecessary, given the temporary nature of the spike in 
inflation (as noted above); and also because there are other ways for the government to neutralize 
the potential inflationary impact of reserve accumulation. For example, one way to do this would be 
to spend some of the excess international reserves on imports, which could include productive 
investment such as irrigation equipment for agriculture.  Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 23 
External Sector 
As shown in Figure 13, Bolivia has had widening trade surpluses in recent years, mostly due to the 
increase in prices for its primary exports. Exports increased from 30.1 percent of GDP in 2005 to 
41.7 percent of GDP in 2008, while imports only moved from 24 to 28.3 percent of GDP, thus 
creating double digit trade surpluses for the three years 2006-2008. There was a sharp fall-off in 
exports in 2009, to 27.1 percent of GDP for the first quarter, mostly due to declining prices; imports 
also fell sharply, but not as much, leading to a smaller but still sizeable trade surplus. The rise and fall 
of prices for Bolivia’s major primary exports can be seen in Figure 14. 
FIGURE 13 
Bolivia: Trade in Goods and Services 
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FIGURE 14 
Bolivia: Real Export Prices, Index 
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The composition of Bolivia’s exports is shown in Figure 15. The increase in hydrocarbon exports, 
from 14.7 to 20.9 percent of GDP for 2005 to 2008, is the biggest movement, followed by minerals 
(from 3.7 percent to 9.2 percent). It is hydrocarbon exports that account for the vast bulk of the fall-
off in exports in 2009, as these revenues declined to 12.1 percent of GDP. However, much of this 
will likely recover, as it results from the prior decline in oil prices (due to the time lag written into 
the hydrocarbon sector’s contracts), and these prices have already bounced back some and could go 
higher as the world economy recovers. Manufacturing has also fallen some in 2008-2009, but not 
very much compared to most countries. Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 25 
FIGURE 15 
Bolivia: Exports as a Percent of GDP, by Industry, 2000-2009 
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Regional Economic Integration and Diversification of Exports 
As shown in Figures 16 and 17, there have been large changes in the destination of Bolivia’s exports 
over the last decade. Exports to Latin America were nearly two-thirds of the total in 2008, as 
compared to 41.5 percent in 1999. At the same time, exports to the United States and Canada and 
Europe have fallen from more than 56 percent of the total to less than 17 percent. Brazil became the 
largest export market of any country, at 16 percent, from just 0.5 percent in 1999; and South Korea 
went from a negligible market to Bolivia’s second largest market for exports.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 26 
FIGURE 16 
Bolivia: Exports to Various Geographical Regions, 1999 - 2008 
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FIGURE 17 
Bolivia: Exports to its Four Largest International Markets, as a Percentage of GDP, 1999-2008 
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Over the last two years, this diversification of export markets has helped Bolivia weather the storm 
of increased hostility from Washington, as the United States slapped trade sanctions on Bolivia 
under the ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act). It has also made Bolivia 
less vulnerable to the recession in the U.S. and Europe. As can be seen in Figure 18, the cut-off of 
Bolivia’s trade preferences would have had more than twice the relative impact on the Bolivian 
economy, if it had occurred five years ago. Nonetheless it is still significant, as these exports 
accounted for 3.2 percent of Bolivia’s exports in 2008.  
FIGURE 18 
Bolivia: Value of ATPA and ATPDEA exports, as a percentage of total export value, 2000 - 2009 
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Foreign Investment 
As can be seen in Figure 19, foreign direct investment (FDI) has fallen steadily since 1998, to 
negative levels in 2005, the picking up some in 2005-2008. The high levels in the late 1990s were 
mostly associated with the extractive industries. It is to be expected that, after the re-nationalization 
of the hydrocarbons industry and some increase of the government’s role in the economy, that FDI 
would not rebound to high levels. But the level of 2-3 percent of GDP for 2006-2008 is only slightly 
below for the region.   Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2009 • 28 
FIGURE 19 
Bolivia: Net Foreign Investment by Type, as a Percent of GDP, 2000 – 2009 
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Net portfolio investment has been in negative territory for almost all of the last decade. However, so 
long as there is not large-scale capital flight, this would not be expected to have much impact on the 
Bolivian economy in the near future. At present, the Bolivian economy is not financially constrained; 
the country has more reserves than it can effectively use. Therefore, the flow of foreign portfolio 
investment is not likely to have much impact. 
Other Negative Shocks to the Economy 
Like other countries in the region, Bolivia has been hit by negative shocks from the world recession. 
The fall in gas and mineral prices has been noted above. As can be seen in Figure 20, the economy 
has also been hit by a falloff in remittances, which peaked at 7.4 percent of GDP in 2007, falling to 
5-5.4 percent for the first half of 2009. Remittances had grown sharply in recent years, as a source of 
foreign exchange earnings, as Figure 21 shows. This fall-off is significant, as these revenues are more 
likely to be spent in the domestic economy than other foreign exchange earnings.  Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 29 
FIGURE 20 
Bolivia: Worker Remittances, 2001 – 2009, as a Percentage of GDP 
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Source: Banco Central de Bolivia 2009b. 
 
Figure 21 shows the rise and fall of foreign aid grants to Bolivia. These peaked at 2.9 percent of 
GDP and have since fallen off to 1.2 percent. 
FIGURE 21 
Bolivia: Foreign Grants, 1997 – 2008 
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Conclusion 
In the last four years, Bolivia has achieved its best growth in three decades, and has implemented 
effective expansionary fiscal policy to counter a number of negative shocks to the economy, 
including the world recession. It has also succeeded in increasing capital formation, reducing the 
dollarization of the economy, and accumulating more than enough international reserves to insure 
against unforeseen negative events. It has also launched some innovative anti-poverty programs. 
At the same time, there is much more to be done, especially to reduce extreme poverty, which 
remains high, and its consequences in terms of health outcomes and educational levels. With a 
greatly expanded resource base as a result of the government’s increased control over the country’s 
national resources, it should be possible to do better in these areas in the years ahead. With regard to 
future growth and development, the country is not financially constrained, and its success going 
forward would appear to depend more on its ability to successfully plan and implement 
development projects, involving both public and private investment. Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales Administration • 31 
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